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Abstract
Young athletes often dream of becoming the next star in their
respective sports.1 A select few go on to realize that dream and become
professional athletes.2 Within this group of superb athletes, there are a rare
few who almost seem as though they were meant for the game, showing
flashes of greatness at a young age
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INTRODUCTION

Young athletes often dream of becoming the next star in their
respective sports.1 A select few go on to realize that dream and become
professional athletes.2 Within this group of superb athletes, there are a rare
few who almost seem as though they were meant for the game, showing
flashes of greatness at a young age.3 National Basketball Association
(“NBA”) superstar, LeBron James, was being touted as an elite player,
drawing comparisons to the all-time great Kobe Bryant despite still being
a high school junior.4 Although the NBA has since amended its draft
eligibility, the delay in going professional after high school is limited to one
year.5 There still remains the possibility of basketball players profiting
financially from their abilities immediately after high school graduation
while foregoing college.6
Baseball prospects are afforded an opportunity to enter the
professional ranks, becoming draft eligible, immediately upon high school
graduation.7 Similarly, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) allows
players, age eighteen or older, to enter the draft.8
Unlike these sports leagues, the National Football League (“NFL”)
imposes a draft eligibility requirement stipulating that a prospective player

1.
See John Underwood, Does Herschel Have Georgia on His Mind?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, 22; NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF
COMPETING
IN
COLLEGE
ATHLETICS
(2016),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016RES_probability-chart-web-pdf_20160502.pdf.
2.
See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22; NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1.
3.
See Grant Wahl, Ahead of His Class, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 18, 2002,
at 62, 64.
4.
Id.
5.
See
NBA
Draft
Rules,
DRAFTSITE.COM,
http://www.draftsite.com/nba/rules/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
6.
See Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A., Via Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at 1.
7.
MLB Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/mlb/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
8.
NHL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nhl/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
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be at least three years removed from high school.9 Furthermore, these
prospects are not afforded a realistic interim alternative to college that
produces a monetary benefit.10 Essentially, the only legitimate path to
becoming a professional football player begins by playing at the collegiate
level.11 The problem arising from the disparity between the NFL draft
eligibility requirements in comparison to the other Big Four American sports
leagues is magnified by the average career spans of each sport’s athletes.12
Professional football players in the NFL have the shortest career spans in
comparison to players in the NBA, NHL, and Major League Baseball
(“MLB”).13 As of 2013, NFL players average a full year less than the
average NBA player, and two years less than NHL and MLB players.14
Additionally, the NFL provides the lowest average player salary of the four
major sports.15 This results in the lowest average potential earnings in what
has been documented as an extremely violent sport that could potentially
have dangerous long-term health effects.16
Due to these draft eligibility restrictions, football prospects are
forced to attend college in an attempt to showcase their talents to prospective
employers in the NFL.17 Under the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) guidelines, these colleges essentially operate as a de facto farm
system that guarantees the maturation and development of players at no cost
to the NFL.18 There are some players that have been viewed as NFL-ready
once they have graduated from high school.19 However, these players are
9.
NFL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nfl/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
10.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 24; see also CFL Adjusts Eligibility Rules for
Draft, CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Sept. 06, 2013), http://www.cfl.ca/2013/09/06/cfladjusts-eligibility-rules-for-draft/. The CFL has more stringent eligibility standards than the
NFL, requiring players to be from a Canadian school—CIS is the Canadian equivalent of
NCAA—or having non-import status. Id.
11.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 22.
12.
See Nick Schwartz, The Average Career Earnings of Athletes Across
America’s Major Sports Will Shock You, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:07 AM),
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls.
13.
See id.
14.
See id.
15.
See id.
16.
See id.; Jason M. Breslow, New: 87 Deceased NFL Players Test Positive
for
Brain
Disease,
PBS:
FRONTLINE
(Sept.
18,
2015),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/new-87-deceased-nfl-players-test-positive-forbrain-disease/. In a recent study about 87 out of 91 players tested positive for brain disease
CTE. Id.
17.
See NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9.
18.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 24, 26.
19.
Skip Bayless, Clarett Belonged in the NFL, ESPN.COM (Aug. 11, 2006),
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=bayless/060811; Jeff Legwold, Adrian Peterson
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subjected to the threat of an injury that could negatively affect, or entirely
eliminate, their earning potential due to the restrictive practices instituted by
the NFL and NCAA.20 Despite the talents of a top prospect, an injury could
potentially shrink the market for their services, as teams will be less willing
to invest millions into a player who may never fully recover.21
While in college, a football player is considered an amateur studentathlete.22 The NCAA operates as a non-profit organization that promotes the
academic and overall well-being of the student-athlete.23 Notwithstanding
the threat of injury, a college football player must submit to the strict
compensation restrictions imposed by the NCAA.24 A player who receives
compensation for their athletic abilities or violates other provisions within
the bylaws may be deemed ineligible to participate in all collegiate sports.25
Since playing college football serves as the sole realistic option to obtaining
employment for their athletic abilities, athletes are forced to accept a free
education as compensation without protest.26 Furthermore, they must refrain
from receiving any compensation that may be attributed to their athletic
abilities.27 This restriction enables only the conference and school that the
player attends to benefit financially from his or her talents.28 Although the
NCAA prides itself on protecting the student aspect of the student-athlete
label for college football players, it has hypocritically committed an act that
the organization was originally founded to protect against: exploitive athletic

Among Few Who Could Make Leap from High School to NFL, ESPN.COM: NFL NATION (Oct.
2, 2015), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/182078/adrian-peterson-amongfew-who-could-make-leap-from-high-school-to-nfl.
20.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL art. 12.1.2.1 (2009); John Harris, 2016 NFL Draft: Injury Crushes Draft Stock of
POST
(Feb.
29,
2016),
Notre
Dame
LB
Jaylon
Smith,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2016/02/29/2016-nfl-draft-injury-crushesdraft-stock-of-notre-dame-lb-jaylon-smith/; Mark Viera, Rutgers Player Is Paralyzed Below
the Neck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at D1.
21.
See Harris, supra note 20.
22.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.01,
12.1.
23.
Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last
visited Apr. 9, 2017).
24.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1.
25.
Id.
26.
See id. at art. 12.1.2.1, 15.1.
27.
Id. at art. 12.1.
28.
See id.; Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff: Conference Payouts, BUS.
C. SPORTS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.businessofcollegesports.com/2014/12/08/collegefootball-playoff-conference-payouts/. Over $50 million in revenue was distributed to each
Power 5 conference for the 2014 through 2015 bowl season. Dosh, supra.
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practices.29 It is no secret that college football is a massive source of
revenue for schools.30 However, these schools are operating under the guise
of the NCAA’s core values, enabling them to use unfair bargaining power to
obtain the services of football players without fair compensation.31 On
average, college football players are less prepared academically to succeed in
the classroom.32 If they are not able to maintain a certain grade point
average, they may not only lose their scholarship, but also their ability to
obtain employment in the NFL.33 There are similarities between a
development league like the MLB minor league system and the college ranks
of football.34 The most notable is the ability to develop talent to play at a
professional level.35 However, a minor league prospect is able to
simultaneously hone his or her skills while benefitting financially from these
same talents, whereas a college football player must endure at least three
years of schooling prior to receiving an opportunity to be compensated
financially for his or her athletic prowess.36 Some student-athletes benefit
from the education received from this arrangement.37 However, a substantial
amount of college football players enter college with the sole intention of
going to the NFL without obtaining a college degree.38
29. See Dosh, supra note 28; History, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://www.web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/connect
/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last visited Apr. 19,
2017).
30.
See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances: 2014-15 Finances, USA
TODAY, http://www.sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); Dosh,
supra note 28.
31.
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058–59
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
32.
Doug Lederman, The Admissions Gap for Big-Time Athletes, INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Dec.
29,
2008,
4:00
AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/12/29/admit. “[C]ritics tend to argue that the
colleges are doing a disservice to athletes who come in underprepared, and suggest that
colleges may be achieving those higher graduation rates, in part, by directing athletes into less
demanding academic programs . . . .” Id.
33.
See Seth Soffian, College Sports:
Scholarships Not Four-Year
Guarantees, NEWS-PRESS.COM (Oct. 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.newspress.com/story/sports/college/fgcu/2015/10/16/college-sports-scholarships-not-four-yearguarantees/74009542/.
34.
See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7.
35.
See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7.
36.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1.2.1;
MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7; NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9.
37.
See Christopher Bogan, 41% in NFL Graduate from College: Rate in
Pacific 10 Conference Only 38%, Report Shows, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1986),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1986-01-27/sports/sp-719_1_graduation-rate;
Lederman,
supra note 32.
38.
Bogan, supra note 37; see also Lederman, supra note 32.
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This Comment will explain how the application of antitrust laws has
affected previous sports related litigation.39 Furthermore, it will explain the
rule of reason, a test courts have used to determine whether certain conduct
falls within the purview of antitrust scrutiny.40 Subsequently, this Comment
will apply the rule of reason to the deceptive practices engaged by the NFL
and NCAA, revealing unreasonable labor market restrictions whilst
debunking the previous litigation defenses used by both entities.41
II.

ANTITRUST LAWS

The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is [hereby] declared to be
illegal.”42 While the broad language of the Sherman Act may encompass
almost any contract, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
recognized that the Act is “intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints
of trade.”43
A.

Labor Exemption

The National Labor Relations Act was enacted primarily to “promote
collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted employee” efforts
including unionizing.44 Unfortunately, unions are inherently anticompetitive,
as the “Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor
organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a
consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on
differences in such standards.”45 By relinquishing individual rights to obtain
an employment contract, employees are able to collectively benefit as a
group in negotiations based on their strength in numbers.46 A sacrifice for
the greater good can certainly be identified as anticompetitive.47 Labor
39.
See infra Part II.
40.
See infra Section II.B.
41.
See infra Part III.
42.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
43.
Id.; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
44.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C.
McKinnon, Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the
Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 383 (1984).
45.
McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383–84; see also United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965).
46.
See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 384–85.
47.
See id. at 383–85.
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negotiations such as standard wages may benefit some workers, but may be
detrimental for others who may be able to command a higher wage based on
experience or other factors.48 This ultimately leads to the conflict regarding
whether agreements between employers and unions fall under antitrust
scrutiny due to their inherent anticompetitive nature.49 After all, the
Sherman Act was created “to promote freedom of competition in the
marketplace.”50 Although agreements between employers and unions are
considered to be restraints on trade, a “[[n]on-statutory exemption] generally
applies when a union, acting with a non-labor party, seeks to attain goals
which are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act, unless the Union acts with a predatory anti-competitive
purpose.”51 Mandatory subjects of bargaining have been defined as “wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”52
B.

Rule of Reason

Since sports leagues consist of numerous competing teams, mutual
agreements to have restraints on competition are necessary to maintain the
integrity of the product.53 Therefore, it is likely that, while the rules of these
leagues may constitute a per se violation, the appropriate rule to apply would
be the rule of reason.54 The rule of reason test is comprised of three steps.55
In the first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct has a
substantial adverse effect on competition within a market.56 Second, the
defendant must provide evidence that the challenged conduct promotes
competition.57
Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there are
substantially less restrictive means to achieve the procompetitive
justifications provided by the defendant.58 After each side has presented its
arguments on the issue, the court will apply a balancing test to determine
whether the conduct presents an unreasonable restraint.59
48.
Id. at 384–85.
49.
See id. at 385.
50.
Id. at 383.
51.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004).
52.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
53.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
54.
Id. at 1064.
55.
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2001).
56.
Id. at 1063.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 1062.
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C.
Litigation History Based on Labor Market Restraint in Sports
Leagues
1.

The Spencer Haywood Rule

Spencer Haywood was a tremendous basketball prospect hailing
from Detroit, Michigan.60 During his prep years, he won several prestigious
accolades, including All-Detroit, All-Michigan, and All-American honors.61
His success would continue after his graduation from high school in 1967.62
At the collegiate level, he earned All-American honors during his lone
seasons at Trinidad Junior College and the University of Detroit.63 More
impressive was the fact that he was named Outstanding Player at the
Olympic basketball games64 at the age of nineteen.65 At the age of twenty,
he entered into a contract with the Denver Rockets of the American
Basketball Association (“ABA”).66 His talents clearly transcended across
every level of competition, as he would go on to be “named ‘Rookie of the
Year,’ and ‘Most Valuable Player in the ABA’ for the 1969-70 [s]eason.”67
After his rookie season, he signed a new contract with the Rockets
but would later refuse to render services due to its fraudulent terms. 68 Later
that year, he signed with a NBA team, the Seattle Supersonics, despite a
provision in the NBA bylaws that would deem him ineligible to play. 69
Haywood would then file claims against the NBA and its member teams for
60.
See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1052
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052; Scoop Jackson, It’s Time to Honor
Spencer Haywood’s Impact on Hoops and History, ESPN.COM (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/13627349/spencer-haywood-impact-hoops-history.
One thing that will probably be overlooked in Spencer Haywood’s induction into
the Basketball Hall of Fame . . . is the gift God gave him to play the game. How, as
a [twenty-one] year-old playing in the NBA, Haywood was a rarity. How, at
[nineteen] years old, he became the youngest American to make an Olympic
basketball team.

Jackson, supra.
66.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 1053–54. “The contract does not provide for compensation for
Haywood’s services for six years in the amount of $1,900,000. Compensation in excess of
$394,000 is illusory and indefinite.” Id. at 1053.
69.
Id. at 1054. “At the time that Haywood contracted to play professional
basketball for Denver, the ABA had a four-year rule similar to that provided for in By-Law
2.05 of NBA. The ABA found that its four-year rule was a hardship on Haywood and waived
it.” Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1054.
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engaging in an “unlawful conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.”70 Shortly following a decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States to lift a stay on an injunction allowing
him to play for his team,71 the NBA and Haywood would reach an out-ofcourt settlement that allowed him to play for the Supersonics.72
The argument in Haywood’s favor was that, as the sole wage
earner in his struggling family, he was a hardship case and
therefore had a right to begin earning his living. . . . Beginning in
1971, underclassmen were allowed to enter the NBA Draft
provided they could give evidence of hardship to the NBA office.
In 1976, the hardship requirement was eliminated in favor of the
current Early Entry procedure, whereby any athlete with remaining
college eligibility can enter the NBA Draft on the condition that he
notifies the league office at least [forty-five] days before the
73
draft.

Although the court did not ultimately rule on the draft eligibility
rule, it provided insight into the court’s view on the restraint it created.74 The
NBA provision at the time provided that:
A person who has not completed high school or who has
completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA] until four
years after he has been graduated or four years after his original
75
high school class has been graduated . . . .

The court determined that without an injunction, the rule would
eliminate Haywood’s chances of playing basketball, at any level, for an
70.
Id. at 1054.
71.
Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1207 (1971); see also
William C. Rhoden, Early Entry? One and Done? Thank Spencer Haywood for the
TIMES
(June
29,
2016),
Privilege,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/sports/basketball/spencer-haywood-rule-nba-draftunderclassmen.html.
72.
Rhoden, supra note 71.
73.
Spencer
Haywood,
NBA.COM,
http://www.nba.com/history/players/haywood_bio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
74.
See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1056. “There is a substantial
probability in light of all the evidence presented to this [c]ourt that the so-called college draft .
. . constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of Haywood and other
potential NBA players to negotiate freely for the rendition of their services to NBA teams.”
Id.
75.
Id. at 1055, 1058 (alteration in original) (stating that the conduct by the
NBA “[was] in furtherance of . . . violations of the antitrust laws”).
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entire year, because it would deem him ineligible to play in the NBA.76
Furthermore, he was already ineligible to participate at the collegiate level.77
This would certainly be a travesty, given the fact that Haywood had already
proven that he could compete and dominate in the professional ranks.78 The
court found that “[a] professional basketball player [had] a very limited
career.”79
If Haywood is unable to continue to play professional
basketball for Seattle, he will suffer irreparable injury in that a
substantial part of his playing career will have been dissipated, his
physical condition, skills and coordination will deteriorate from
lack of high-level competition, his public acceptance as a super
star will diminish to the detriment of his career, his self-esteem
and his pride will have been injured and a great injustice will be
80
perpetrated on him.

The impact of this case can be felt still today, as underclassmen
entering the draft has become commonplace.81 Although the NBA argued
that the influx of young players would destroy the league and college
basketball by “siphoning . . . talent from college basketball teams . . .
[effectively] ruin[ing] the NBA’s pool of talent,”82 both entities are
thriving.83

76.
See id. at 1057, 1060.
77.
Id. at 1056. Due to NCAA amateurism rules, Haywood would be
considered ineligible as he already signed and played for a professional team. See Denver
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060–61.
78.
See Spencer Haywood, supra note 73. Haywood led the league in scoring,
averaging 30 points a game and rebounding 19.5 rebounds per game while also winning the
league’s Most Valuable Player. Id.
79.
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057.
80.
Id.
81.
See Rhoden, supra note 71.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.; see also Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193467/total-leaguerevenue-of-the-nba-since-2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). During the 2014–15 season the
NBA posted revenue of 5.18 billion. Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in
Billion U.S. Dollars), supra; Chris Isidore, Most Profitable NCAA Teams, CNN: MONEY
(Mar. 16, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2015/03/16/news/companies/ncaamost-profitable/. The Louisville Cardinals “posted $24 million in profits on [college
basketball] revenue of about $40 million during the 2013–14 school year . . . .” Isidore, supra.
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Maurice Clarett

Before his legal troubles, Maurice Clarett was a star in the making. 84
To this day, he is still arguably one of the best prep football players in Ohio’s
prep football history.85 During his high school senior season, he amassed
2194 rushing yards, a mind-blowing thirty-eight touchdowns, and was on his
way to being named “USA Today National Offensive Player of the Year and
Mr. Football.”86 In 2002, he would enroll at Ohio State University,
becoming the first freshman running back to start for the school since 1943.87
Standing at six feet tall and weighing two hundred and thirty pounds, he was
already bigger than some of the NFL’s all-time great running backs.88
During his freshman campaign, he set freshman rushing and touchdown
records, while also providing an influential performance that resulted in Ohio
State emerging victorious in the National Championship over favored
Miami.89
Close friend LeBron James was just finishing his senior season at St.
Vincent-St. Mary when this was transpiring.90 After all the glory Clarett had
brought to Ohio State, he still had to wait two more years to be drafteligible.91 To add insult to injury, James called Clarett to inform him of a
massive, seven-year, $93 million deal with Nike before he had even been
drafted.92 Being immersed in the luxuries that accompany a professional
84.
See Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN.COM (Sept.
18, 2006), http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204.
85.
Eric Frantz, Ohio’s Top 50 Athletes of the Decade: No. 36 Maurice
Clarett, JJHUDDLE.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.jjhuddle.com/2010/02/05/ohios-top-50athletes-of-the-decade-no-36-maurice-clarett/. To cap his senior season, Clarett rushed for
785 yards and eight touchdowns in the playoffs—in three games. Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, supra note 84.
88.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). “Clarett . . . is taller and heavier than some of the NFL’s all-time greatest running
backs, including Walter Payton—5’10”, 200, Barry Sanders—5’8”, 203, and Emmitt Smith—
5’9”, 207.” Id.
89.
See Frantz, supra note 85; Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Maurice
Clarett, supra note 84.
90.
See Pablo S. Torre, Lost Stories of Lebron, Part 2, ESPN.COM,
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/9825057/lebron-james-maurice-clarett-were-fellow-ohionatives-drastically-different-futures-espn-magazine (last updated October 19, 2013, 10:13
AM). The Ohioans were “born one year and [fifty] miles of I-76 apart”—James hailing from
Akron, and Clarett from Youngstown. Id.
91.
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004);
Torre, supra note 90.
92.
Torre, supra note 90. Clarett was often with James during James’ rise to
fame. Id. This included meeting numerous celebrities. Id. (“There was the time they hung
out with Jay Z backstage. There was the time they attended a party in Cleveland and Biz
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career, Clarett fell victim to wanting compensation for his athletic
achievements as well.93 “Clarett sa[id] he was intoxicated by being a
somebody. And, if [you are] a somebody, you want to be around another
somebody.”94 NFL executives commenting about Clarett’s status as a NFL
caliber player, despite not being eligible, certainly boosted his ego as well.95
Before his sophomore season, Clarett was suspended for the entire season
“for accepting thousands of dollars in illicit extra benefits,” coupled with
allegations of academic fraud.96 Unable to play at the collegiate level for a
year and not wanting his skills to diminish from inactivity, Clarett decided to
challenge the NFL’s draft eligibility rule that mandated a player be three
years removed from high school.97
a.

Clarett: Circuit Court of Appeals Reversal

A district court ruled in Maurice Clarett’s favor in Clarett v.
National Football League (“Clarett I”),98 holding that the NFL’s eligibility
rules were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws.99
On appeal, the court reversed the ruling.100 The stark difference between
these two rulings was that the appellate court found that the eligibility rule
was afforded non-statutory exemption status from antitrust scrutiny, whereas
the district court did not.101 In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,102 the Supreme
Court of the United States provided that although a collectively bargained
provision may be a mandatory bargaining subject, it should be examined by
Markie deejayed. There was the time Clarett traded numbers with Snoop Dogg, who knew the
tailback from controlling him on PlayStation.”). Id.
93.
See id.
94.
Torre, supra note 90.
95.
See Bob Glauber, Clarett Sues NFL for Right to Enter Draft, NEWSDAY
(Sept. 23, 2003, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/clarett-sues-nfl-for-right-to-enterdraft-1.399287. “If Clarett is deemed eligible for the draft, it [is] likely he would be a firstround choice, according to several league executives . . . . ‘I [am] sure someone would take a
chance on him,’ one NFL personnel director said.” Id.
96.
Rusty Miller, Clarett Suspended for 2003 Season for 16 NCAA Violations,
TODAY
(Sept.
10,
2003,
2:36
PM),
USA
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2003-09-10-clarettsuspension_x.htm; see also Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid in
Ohio State Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at SP1.
97.
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
98.
306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
99.
Id. at 410–11.
100.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
101.
Compare Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138, with Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at
397.
102.
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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balancing the “interests of union members” served by the restraint against
“its relative impact on the product market,” before being granted exemption
status.103
The court reasoned:
[T]o permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that
their concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market
would seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by
these [federal] labor laws, including the congressional policy
favoring collective bargaining, the bargaining parties’ freedom of
contract, and the widespread use of multi-employer bargaining
104
units.

Rather than determine the impact on the product market in
accordance with the test formulated by Justice White, the court provided
support for the power of unions and their importance in the labor law
relations.105 Additionally, they found that “the eligibility rules constitute a
mandatory bargaining subject because they have tangible effects on the
wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”106 This Comment
will further examine those tangible effects in Part B.107
3.

O’Bannon Case

Ed O’Bannon was a former All-American basketball player at the
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) who was informed by a
friend that his likeness was being used in a video game. 108 In 2009,
O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”)
in O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon I”),109 claiming “that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules [prohibited] . . . student-athletes from [receiving]
103.
Id. at 261. The court agreed with Justice White’s approach “[w]hen
confronted with allegations that agreements between labor and employers damaged
competition in the business or product market, we have previously regarded Justice White’s
decision in Jewel Tea as setting forth the ‘classic formulation’ of the non-statutory
exemption.” Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 132 n.12 (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)).
104.
Id. at 135.
105.
See id. at 132, 138–39. “The players union’s representative possesses
‘powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents.’” Id. at 139.
106.
Id. at 140.
107.
See infra Section III.B.2.
108.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 277 (2016).
109.
802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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compensat[ion] for the use of their [name, image, and likeness].”110
Meanwhile, Sam Keller, a former college quarterback filed a separate suit
against the NCAA, CLC, and Electronic Arts (“EA”), “a software company
that produced video games based on college football and men’s basketball
from the late 1990s until around 2013.”111 The two cases were consolidated,
receiving class certification.112 After the plaintiffs settled their claims with
EA and CLC, the cases were deconsolidated, and in 2014, the antitrust
claims against the NCAA went to trial before the district court.113 The
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the NCAA’s rules
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their name,
image, and likeness violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.114 On appeal, the
NCAA asserted that because the NCAA court held amateur rules valid, any
challenge to them must fail.115 Rather than categorically approving all
amateurism rules, the NCAA explained why its rules should be analyzed
under the rule of reason.116 Although the opinion on amateurism served as
mere dicta, the O’Bannon I court held high regard for its contents.117
Summarily, despite amateurism rules serving a procompetitive purpose, it
“can . . . be invalid[ated] under the rule of reason if a substantially less
restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally well.”118 The
appellate court’s decision “reaffirm[ed] that NCAA regulations are subject to
antitrust scrutiny and must be tested in the crucible of the [r]ule of
[r]eason.”119

110.
Id. at 1055.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 1056.
114.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
115.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
116.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1062–63; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
468 U.S. at 113–20.
117.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063. “To be sure, ‘[w]e do not treat considered
dicta from the Supreme Court lightly;’ such dicta should be accorded appropriate deference.”
Id. (alteration in original).
118.
Id. at 1063–64.
119.
Id. at 1079. “[T]he NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts
cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act’s rules.”
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/4

14

Ayeni: Intentional Grounding: How The NCAA And NFL Have Engaged In Pract

2017]

INTENTIONAL GROUNDING

III.

279

NFL AND NCAA RESTRAINT ON LABOR MARKET

It can be argued that football, and not baseball, is America’s true
national pastime.120 Despite the violence of the sport, its media appeal has
helped the sport grow tremendously.121 Colleges and NFL teams profit from
the services of a distinct individual a football player.122 The demarcation
of college football players and professional football players are monotonous
when the horrifying possibility of permanent injury is a common threat faced
on any play.123 Yet, these college football players subject their bodies to this
threat for a hopeful financial reward.124 Given the rise in player contract
values,125 or the huge investments into athletic facilities by colleges to lure
recruits,126 the market for football players’ services is ever-growing. As
fans’ demands grow, so too does the supply.127 In 2008, ESPN agreed to pay
the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) “a staggering $2.25 billion over the
120.
See Lucy McCalmont, Football Has Taken Over Baseball as the True
POST
(Apr.
16,
2015,
11:35
AM),
National
Pastime,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/football-national-pastime_n_7078660.html.
121.
Id.
It has been a long, long time since baseball was truly America’s pastime,
and it has nothing to do with anything baseball has done wrong. It has been since .
. . television. . . . The NFL is terrific to watch on television in a way baseball [is
not] and never was, and we are a nation of television watchers. The minute people
realized how easy football was to follow on television—even if it really tells you
very little of [what is] actually going on—was the minute baseball stopped being
America’s pastime.

Id.
122.
See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish
TRIB.
(Dec.
23,
2015,
6:40
AM),
Athletic
Facilities,
CHI.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222story.html.
123.
See Viera, supra note 20, at D1.
124.
See id.; Adam Schefter & Jeff Legwold, Broncos Sign Von Miller for 6
Years; Deal Worth $114.5M, Sources Say, ESPN.COM (July 15, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17084231/denver-broncos-von-miller-agree-6-year-1145million-deal.
125.
See Schefter & Legwold, supra note 123.
126.
Hobson & Rich, supra note 121.
Big-time college athletic departments are taking in more money than
ever—and spending it just as fast. A decade of rampant athletics construction
across the country has redefined what it takes to field a competitive top-tier college
sports program.
Football stadiums and basketball arenas now must be
complemented by practice facilities, professional-quality locker rooms, players’
lounges with high-definition televisions and video game systems, and luxury suites
to coax more money from boosters.

Id.
127.
See ACC, ESPN Partner for New Conference Channel, ESPN.COM (July
18, 2016), http://www.espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/17102933/acc-espn-agree-20year-rights-deal-lead-2019-launch-acc-network.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

15

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

280

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

next [15] years—about $150 million a year—for the conference’s TV
rights.”128 More recently, Mercedes-Benz purchased the naming rights to a
newly constructed NFL stadium for $1.4 billion.129 This is all driven by the
on-field product provided by these football players.130
A.

NCAA

Due to the NFL’s draft eligibility rules, it is common practice for a
football prospect to play at the collegiate level prior to becoming a
professional.131 In fact, colleges serve as a de facto development league for
the NFL.132 The NFL is grateful for the financial rewards of having colleges
as a supplier of premier football services.133 Although both the NFL and
NCAA may identify as competitors providing similar products, they both
benefit financially from practices that unreasonably restrain the market for
football players.134 This is possible because of their firm control on the
market for the players’ services.135

128.
Michael Smith & John Ourand, ESPN Pays $2.25B for SEC Rights,
BUS.
J.
(Aug.
25,
2008),
SPORTS
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2008/08/20080825/This-WeeksNews/ESPN-Pays-$225B-For-SEC-Rights.aspx.
129.
Tim Tucker, Falcons Officially Announce Mercedes-Benz as Naming
(Aug.
24,
2015,
10:04
AM),
Rights
Partner,
AJC.COM
http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/falcons-officially-announce-mercedes-benz-asnamin/nnP9Y/.
130.
See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22.
131.
See id. at 22–23; NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5.
132.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 24.
133.
See id.
134.
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062
(9th Cir. 2015) cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F.
Supp. 2d 379, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
135.
Michael Janofsky, U.S.F.L. Loses in Antitrust Case; Jury Assigns Just $1
in Damages, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/30/sports/usflloses-in-antitrust-case-jury-assigns-just-1-in-damages.html. Despite losing, the U.S.F.L.
succeeded in proving that the NFL was a monopoly. Id.; see also United States v. Walters,
997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993).
The NCAA depresses athletes’ income—restricting payments to the value of
tuition, room, and board, while receiving services of substantially greater worth.
The NCAA treats this as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced
eye would see it as the use of monopsony power to obtain athletes’ services for less
than the competitive market price.

Walters, 997 F.2d at 1225.
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Amateurism

Founded in 1906, the NCAA sought out to remedy the problem that
was being created by colleges competing for the best players.136 In doing so,
“one of [its] earliest reforms . . . was a requirement that . . . participants be
amateurs.”137 To maintain amateurism, a student-athlete must not receive
compensation other than what is permitted by the NCAA.138 Even then, the
compensation received was insufficient.139 In 2014, the NCAA finally
allowed scholarships to be awarded up to the full cost of attendance.140 In
addition to the compensation rules, the NCAA adopted several other
amateurism protecting rules that restrain the market for football players’
services.141 An amateur may lose their eligibility to play at the collegiate
level if they sign a contract with a professional team, enter a professional
league’s player draft, or hire an agent.142 Additionally, the NCAA generally
limits the mobility of an athlete by imposing a transfer penalty, mandating
that a transferring athlete sit-out one season immediately after transferring
before being eligible to play.143 This can potentially affect an athlete’s
ability to market themselves to the future purchasers of their services, the
NFL.144
Players, however, suffer a severe penalty for
transferring—the loss of a year of athletics eligibility. This can
make them a very unattractive option for coaches who are under
constant win now pressure. The NCAA’s transfer rules restrain
players’ ability to make the best choices for themselves, including

136.
137.
138.
139.

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054; History, supra note 29.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.

The cost of attendance at a particular school includes the items that make up a grant
in aid plus ‘[nonrequired] books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses
related to attendance at the institution.’ The difference between a grant in aid and
the cost of attendance is a few thousand dollars at most schools.

Id. at 1054 n.3 (alteration in original).
140.
Id. at 1054–55.
141.
Id. at 1055.
142.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2.
143.
Joe Nocera, With College Transfer Rules, Hypocrisy Never Sits Out a
Year,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/sports/ncaabasketball/with-college-transfer-ruleshypocrisy-never-sits-out-a-year.html; see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1.
144.
See Nocera, supra note 143; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1.
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ones based on financial considerations, academic considerations,
145
athletics considerations, and personal circumstances.

However, the most important rule prohibits athletes—with a few
exceptions—from receiving, either direct or indirect, payment for their
athletic skill.146
The NCAA, with varying success, has used the defense that all
amateurism rules are legally valid.147 Recently, O’Bannon I provided a
clearer depiction of the intent in the NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma148 case, holding that not all rules that are linked to
amateurism were immune from antitrust scrutiny.149
2.

Rule of Reason Application to Amateurism Rules

The NCAA’s bylaws applying to amateurism may be afforded
antitrust scrutiny due to their effect on commerce.150 “[T]he modern legal
understanding of commerce is broad, ‘including almost every activity from
which the actor anticipates economic gain.’”151 “Despite the nonprofit status

145.
Steve Berkowitz, Lawsuit Challenges Rule for Transfers Between NCAA
Division I Football Schools, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:44 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/03/08/lawsuit-ncaa-division-footballtransfer-rules-peter-deppe-iowa-hawkeyes-northern-illinois-huskies/81510022/;
see
also
Nocera, supra note 143.
[T]he case of Baker Mayfield, the Sooners’ current quarterback, who walked on to
the Texas Tech team as a freshman, then transferred to Oklahoma, where he walked
on to its football team, too. Mayfield not only had to sit out a year but also lost a
year of eligibility because of a Big 12 rule that punishes players who dare to move
to a different college within the conference. The fact that Mayfield [did not] have
an athletic scholarship made no difference.

Nocera, supra note 143.
146.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra
note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2.1. “[M]ost importantly, an athlete is prohibited—with few
exceptions—from receiving any pay based on his athletic ability, whether from boosters,
companies seeking endorsements, or would-be licensors of the athlete’s name, image, and
likeness, NIL.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original).
147.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063. “Quoting heavily from the language in
Board of Regents that we have emphasized, the NCAA contends that any Section 1 challenge
to its amateurism rules must fail as a matter of law because the Board of Regents Court held
that those rules are presumptively valid.” Id.; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
148.
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
149.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at
120.
150.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065.
151.
Id.; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 340
(7th Cir. 2012). “No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college
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of NCAA member schools, the transactions those schools make with premier
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of
these transactions.”152 Student-athletes considering scholarship offers often
weigh economic factors, such as the earning potential of a degree or the
likelihood of entering the NFL.153 Therefore, the transactions that take place
between the NCAA and student-athletes are somewhat commercial in
nature.154
“In December 2010, the Buckeyes suspended star quarterback
Terrelle Pryor,” and four other players “for the first five games of the 2011
season for selling memorabilia and receiving discounted services at a local
tattoo parlor.”155 “Pryor sold his 2008 Big Ten championship ring, Fiesta
Bowl sportsmanship award,” and other personal items.156 “He was ordered
to repay a total of $2500.”157 This punishment seems counterintuitive to the
promotion of capitalism to prevent anyone from profiting from his or her
own hard work in any capacity.158
a.

Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market

There is a market for football players’ services, in which some
football players are the reluctant sellers and the schools are the
purchasers of their “athletic services and licensing rights.”159 The NCAA
thus operates as a monopsony,160 in that it is the only purchaser of this
particular good for a reserved population of football players.161
Consequently, price-fixing occurs when the compensation awarded to
football programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program.” Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340.
152.
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340; see also Berkowitz et al., supra note 30.
153.
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341.
154.
Id.
155.
Zach Dirlam, Scandal at Ohio State (Part 1 of 5): The Tattooed Five and
REP.
(June
1,
2011),
Tressel’s
Cover
Up,
BLEACHER
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/719411-scandal-at-ohio-state-part-1-of-5-the-tattooedfive-tressels-cover-up.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Kevin Trahan, How the NCAA’s Marxist Philosophy is Hurting its
(Aug.
18,
2014,
4:49
PM),
Athletes,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevintrahan/2014/08/18/how-the-ncaa-hurts-the-players-itclaims-to-protect/.
159.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 991
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
160.
Id.
161.
See id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

19

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

284

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

student-athletes is limited to the grant-in-aid provided by the school, despite
the level of talent.162 The students have no bargaining power.163 Likewise,
the schools cannot exceed the compensation awarded without facing
penalty.164 However, due to the same rule, the schools still have another
profitable venture in which they have no competition—the licensing rights of
their players.165 Although the NCAA prohibits the use of a student-athlete’s
name, image, or appearance to promote commercial ventures,166 it is able to
profit from student-athletes through disingenuous means.167
Throughout college stadiums, fans don the jerseys of their favorite
168
players.
Every year, a portion of the revenue from different programs
across the nation can be attributed to jersey sales.169 Although a studentathlete cannot sell his or her own personal belongings attributable to their
athletic ability, a school can sell a replica jersey of that same player under the
facade that it does not reflect the player’s likeness or image simply because
their name is missing from the jersey.170 This thinking is pure lunacy.171 The
162.
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016). “The ‘combination[s]
condemned by the [Sherman] Act’ also include ‘price-fixing . . . by purchasers’ even though
‘the persons specially injured . . . are sellers, not customers or consumers.’” Id. at 1070
(alteration in original).
163.
Nicolas A. Novy, “The Emperor Has No Clothes”: The NCAA’s Last
Chance as the Middle Man in College Athletics, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 227, 232 (2014).
164.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 §
16.01.1; Eric Dodds, The ‘Death Penalty’ and How the College Sports Conversation Has
Changed, TIME (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.time.com/3720498/ncaa-smu-death-penalty/.
SMU infamously violated several NCAA rules, by providing illegal compensation for recruits
to attend the university. Dodds, supra. The NCAA imposed what was dubbed the death
penalty, with sanctions including the program being banned from bowl games and stripped of
forty-five scholarships for two years. Id. “There[] [is] a reason that a popular sports joke in
the early ‘80s was that [Eric] Dickerson took a pay-cut when he graduated and went to the
NFL.” Id.
165.
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 31 §
31.6.4.2.
166.
Id. at art. 12.5.1.1.
167.
Joseph Milord, It’s All Profit and No Pay: How the NCAA is an Ingenious
Business, ELITE DAILY (Mar. 20, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.elitedaily.com/money/ncaaingenious-business-ever-created-tuesday/.
168.
See Novy, supra note 163, at 237.
169.
See id. at 236; Milord, supra note 167; Marc Tracy, Days of Selling
Popular College Players’ Jerseys Seems Numbered, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/sports/ncaafootball/days-of-selling-popular-collegeplayers-jerseys-seem-numbered.html.
170.
Novy, supra note 163, at 236–37; Milord, supra note 167; Tracy, supra
note 169.
171.
See Kevin Trahan, Long Past Time for College Football Teams to Stop
Selling Real Player Jerseys, SB NATION (June 5, 2014, 2:23 PM),
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number 23 is forever linked to Michael Jordan, just like any other sports
hero’s number will be forever tied to that team.172 If we are to believe that
jersey numbers are ambiguous representations of the school themselves and
not the player, then why do schools retire a revered student-athlete’s number,
a la professionals?173
It is evident that this practice presents an
anticompetitive arrangement that allows only the school to profit from the
marketability of their athletes.174 Even so, schools still use their current
student-athletes likeness in a commercial setting.175 Meanwhile, players are
subjected to watch as schools reap the financial reward from their services,
while they are unable to receive a breadcrumb for their efforts.176
b.

Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition

While the courts have generally recognized the importance of
maintaining the amateurism aspect of the college football product,177 they
have also determined “that the NCAA’s definition of amateurism [is]
malleable, changing frequently over time in ‘significant and contradictory
ways.’”178 The NCAA’s current rules do serve a procompetitive benefit by

http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/5/5783202/college-football-player-jerseysreal-numbers.
172.
See Maureen Callahan, Jeter’s Retirement Marks End of Yanks’ SingleDigit Numbers, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/30/jetersretirement-marks-end-of-yanks-single-digit-numbers/; Tracy, supra note 169. “The Yankees
will hit another milestone this season besides the retirement of Derek Jeter: [It is] the last time
a single-digit jersey will be worn by a Bronx Bomber.” Callahan, supra. The Yankees are
famous for not displaying player names on their uniform. See id.
173.
See Craig Barnes, Seminoles to Retire Deion’s Number Tonight, SUN
SENTINEL
(Oct.
7,
1995),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-1007/sports/9510060566_1_doak-campbell-stadium-sanders-charlie-ward.
174.
See Tracy, supra note 169; Trahan, supra note 171. “Worried about the
ramifications of selling the numbers tied to student-athletes, several schools have decided not
to sell football jerseys with star players names on it this upcoming season, sources tell ESPN.”
Trahan, supra note 171.
175.
Jason Kirk, NCAA President Faces Fact That Colleges Sell Jerseys with
NATION
(June
20,
2014,
12:20
PM),
Real
Player
Numbers,
SB
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/20/5827802/ncaa-player-jerseys-numbersmark-emmert-obannon. During the O’Bannon case, “Georgia Tech tweeted an image of
football schedule cards, each with a current [player] posed next to a corporate sponsor’s logo.”
Id. Although the schedules were handed out by the school, and not sold, the presence of
commercial sponsors implies a mutual partnership that financially benefits both parties,
through advertising. See id.
176.
See Novy, supra note 163, at 228.
177.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
178.
Id. at 1058.
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promoting amateurism, which helps drive the consumer’s demand for the
product that is college football.179 However, studies have shown that these
rules “do not promote competitive balance” amongst football programs.180
In fact, “restrictions on student-athlete compensation lead many schools . . .
to spend larger portions of their athletic budgets on coaching, recruiting, and
training facilities.”181 It is hard to argue that competitive balance is a true
driving force, with the increasing number of bowl games awarded to
teams.182
The number of bowls has doubled in the last [twenty] years and [it
is] unknown if there will even be enough teams to fill the slots. In
order to qualify for a bowl game, teams must win at least six
games, but a [five-seven] team can fill out a waiver to play for an
available slot.183

To fulfill consumers’ insatiable demand for football, the NCAA has
capitalized on the time period when the NFL season is dwindling down to
steadily increase the number of games available to the market.184 It is
The court suggested that, even today, the NCAA’s definition of amateurism is
inconsistent: [A]lthough players generally cannot receive compensation other than
scholarships, tennis players are permitted to accept up to $10,000 in prize money
before enrolling in college, and student-athletes are permitted to accept Pell grants
even when those grants raise their total financial aid package above their cost of
attendance. It thus concluded that amateurism was not, in fact, a core principle[] of
the NCAA.

Id. at 1058–59 (citations omitted).
179.
Id. at 1059.
180.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
[S]ince the 1970s, numerous sports economists have studied the NCAA’s
amateurism rules and nearly all have concluded that the rules have no discernible
effect on the level of competitive balance. . . . [Also], a 2007 study by economist
Jim Peach published in the Social Science Journal, found that there is ‘little
evidence that the NCAA rules and regulations have promoted competitive balance
in college athletics and no a priori reason to think that eliminating the rules would
change the competitive balance situation.’

Id.
181.

Id.

The fact that high-revenue schools are able to spend freely in these other areas
cancels out whatever leveling effect the restrictions on student-athlete pay might
otherwise have. The NCAA does not do anything to rein in spending by the highrevenue schools or minimize existing disparities in revenue and recruiting.

Id. at 978 79.
182.
See Nick Schwartz & Laken Litman, Are There Too Many College
TODAY
(May
6,
2015,
3:11
PM),
Football
Bowl
Games?,
USA
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/05/are-there-too-many-college-football-bowl-games.
183.
Id. “Playing in a bowl game used to be a reward. Now [it is] getting
overly commercial and out of control.” Id.
184.
See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/4

22

Ayeni: Intentional Grounding: How The NCAA And NFL Have Engaged In Pract

2017]

INTENTIONAL GROUNDING

287

apparent that this is mainly commercially driven based on the astounding
profits from bowl games, despite the dilution of competition.185
Although the NCAA promotes a product that is unique from the
NFL, and amateurism is an integral component of that product, studentathlete compensation is not the driving force behind consumer demand for its
product.186 “Dr. Emmert, [the NCAA commissioner], himself noted that
much of the popularity of the NCAA’s annual men’s basketball tournament
stems from the fact that schools from all over the country participate ‘so the
fan base has an opportunity to cheer for someone from their region of the
country.’”187
The NCAA has also argued that the restraints on student-athlete
compensation integrates athletics and academics, and promotes competition
for football players’ services by increasing the quality of the educational
services its member schools provide to student-athletes.188 Contrarily, one of
the NCAA’s expert witnesses in the O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon II”)189
case, Dr. James Heckman, “testified that the long-term educational and
academic benefits that student-athletes enjoy stem from their increased
access to financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured
schedules, and other educational services that are unrelated to the
[compensation] rules.”190 It is well documented how schools exploit the
talents of student-athletes while shuffling them through the education
185.
See Dosh, supra note 28. An increase in bowl games from thirty-five
games in 2014 to thirty-nine in 2015, resulted in a $196 million increase in revenue. College
(Apr.
14,
2015),
Bowl
Payouts
Surpass
$500
Million,
ESPN.COM
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/12688517/college-bowl-game-payoutssurpass-500-million-first-year-college-football-playoff. Surprisingly, schools’ expenses in
relation to the revenue declined more than ten percent over this span. See id.
186.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). “[C]onsumers are primarily attracted to
college sports for reasons unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or
affinity for the school in their region of the country.” Id. (citation omitted).
187.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
188.
Id. at 980.
189.
7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
190.
Id. at 980.
The only evidence that the NCAA has presented that suggests that its
challenged rules might be necessary to promote the integration of academics and
athletics is the testimony of university administrators, who asserted that paying
student-athletes large sums of money would potentially create a wedge between
student-athletes and others on campus. These administrators noted that, depending
on how much compensation was ultimately awarded, some student-athletes might
receive more money from the school than their professors. Student-athletes might
also be inclined to separate themselves from the broader campus community by
living and socializing off campus.

Id. (citation omitted).
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system.191 Recently, before a Congressional Committee, Myron Rolle, a
former football player and Rhodes Scholar at Florida State University, “said
that many universities [do not] prioritize an athlete’s education, rendering the
term student-athlete inaccurate.”192
Calling himself an anomaly, Rolle, who was a Rhodes
Scholar, said the number of hours occupied by games, traveling,
workouts, injury treatments, and practices left little time for
studying. With so few athletes continuing their sport after college,
he said, many students do not have much to show for their work
upon graduation.193

A 1980s study done by Northeastern University showed the sad state
of educational affairs for prep athletes, placing “the functional illiteracy rate
for . . . high school football and basketball players at 25[%} to 30[%], twice
the national average.”194
Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star, testified that he felt
like “‘an athlete masquerading as a student’ during his college years.”195 A
1986 study revealed that roughly six out of every ten NFL players did not
have a college degree.196 Though players’ early departure to the league may
have contributed to this statistic, several were ill-equipped to thrive in an
academic setting anyhow.197 Couple this with the rigorous demands the sport

191.
See id. at 975, 984.
192.
Paul Cottle, Former FSU Football Star Tells Congressional Committee
About College Athletes: “A Lot of Them Would Go Through this Academic Machinery and
Get Spit Out, Left Torn, Worn, and Asking Questions.” BRIDGE TO TOMORROW (July 10,
2014),
https://bridgetotomorrow.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/former-fsu-football-star-tellscongressional-committee-about-college-athletes-a-lot-of-them-would-go-through-thisacademic-machinery-and-get-spit-out-left-torn-worn-and-asking-questions/ (emphasis added).
“‘Many of my fellow teammates struggled in that environment,’ Rolle said. ‘Some of them
sent some of their scholarship money home to help their families. They struggled
academically. A lot of them would go through this academic machinery and get spit out, left
torn, worn, and asking questions.’” Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Diana Nyad, How Illiteracy Makes Athletes Run, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
1989, at S8. Former NFL and Oklahoma State football player, Dexter Manley, was a
functioning illiterate, but somehow was accepted into and studied at the school for four years.
Id.
195.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980–81.
196.
Bogan, supra note 37.
197.
See Lederman, supra note 32. The Atlanta Journal Constitution
conducted a study of admission reports for fifty-four colleges between 1990 and 2006. Id.
There was a noticeable difference between football players’ average SAT score when
compared to the average SAT score of a non-athlete incoming student. Id.
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requires,198 and football players are left with little time to realistically focus
on the education aspect that the NCAA vehemently declares is a core
value.199
B.

NFL

The NFL’s draft eligibility rule is not foreign to antitrust suits.200
However, they have escaped antitrust scrutiny due to the non-statutory
exemption that promotes a national labor policy favoring free and private
collective bargaining and requiring good-faith bargaining over wages, hours,
and working conditions.201 The NFL and its player union negotiated the
current collective bargaining agreement that includes the agreed upon
eligibility rules.202 While the National Labor Relations Act was enacted
primarily “to promote collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted
employee” efforts,203 eligibility rules that regulate commercial activity
certainly create a restraint on trade.204
The mere fact that a rule can be characterized as an eligibility rule,
however, does not mean the rule is not a restraint of trade; were
the law otherwise, the NCAA could insulate its member schools’
relationships with student-athletes from antitrust scrutiny by

198.
See Chris Isidore, Playing College Sports: A Long, Tough Job, CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
31,
2014,
6:58
AM),
http://www.money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/news/companies/college-athletes-jobs/.
Up until the season starts, the workload trails off to [fifty] to [sixty]
hours a week. That eases to [forty] to [fifty] hours a week once the season, and
classes, begin. Weeks with road games include a [thirty-seven] hour stretch that
includes travel, practice, a [three] to [four] hour game and some time to sleep in a
strange hotel.
The season usually runs until late November—unless the team is
successful. Then it has to work through to a bowl game, sometimes played on New
Year’s Day. There might be a brief break for the holidays, but, as the NLRB found,
‘While the players are allowed to leave campus for several days before Christmas,
they must report back by Christmas morning.’

Id.
199.
Finances, supra note 23.
200.
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
201.
Id. at 130. “[F]ederal labor statutes . . . delegate related rulemaking and
interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.” Brown v. Pro Football Inc.,
518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
202.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126–27.
203.
McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383.
204.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016).
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renaming every rule governing student-athletes an eligibility
205
rule.

The broad scope in which the Supreme Court of the United States
determined whether an employer-union agreement could be afforded
exemption status, was announced in Justice White’s opinion “advocat[ing]
that the application of the non-statutory exemption should be determined by
balancing the ‘interests of union members’ served by the restraint against ‘its
relative impact on the product market.’”206 Even so, there is ongoing debate
regarding the boundaries of the exemption and what test to apply in
determining whether a rule is truly a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.207
1.

Dispelling the Mandatory Bargaining Subject Ruling of Clarett

In an age in which player safety has come to the forefront for issues
involving the sport, it seems counterintuitive to restrain the labor market
when it is known that these players will subject themselves to the same threat
of injury, albeit at an amateur level.208 With the average career being around
3.5 years,209 the shortest of any major North American professional sport, the
rule accomplishes one thing—prolonging the chance of injury without freely
negotiated compensation, ensuring that “the cream [of NFL talent] will rise
to the top.”210
While it is the NFL Players Association’s (“NFLPA”) duty to seek
the best deal for NFL players, it is far-fetched to still believe—with the
rookie salary amendments—that the “eligibility rules . . . have tangible
effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”211 The
court in Clarett v. NCAA (“Clarett II”)212 opined that “the complex scheme
by which individual salaries in the NFL . . . was built around the
longstanding restraint on the market for entering players imposed by the

205.
Id.
206.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132.
207.
See id. at 131–34.
208.
See id. at 129.
209.
Schwartz, supra note 12.
210.
See id.; Chris Vannini, David Shaw: A College Coach’s No. 1 Job is NOT
to Get Players to the NFL, COACHINGSEARCH.COM (Apr. 16, 2016),
http://www.coachingsearch.com/article?a=David-Shaw-A-college-coachs-No1-job-is-NOTto-get-players-to-the-NFL.
211.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140.
212.
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
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eligibility rules and the related expectations about the average career length
of NFL players.”213
The court later states, “by reducing competition in the market for
entering players, the eligibility rules also affect[ed] the job security of
veteran players.”214 In a dangerous sport where job security and health are so
deeply intertwined that the average career span is shorter than the average
contract length for a rookie player,215 this problem seems de minimis.216 The
NFL has the largest roster size of the major professional sports, yet feels
compelled to impose the strictest draft eligibility rules to prevent younger
players from securing jobs seemingly meant for veterans.217 “[I]t is unlikely
that such raiding would destroy college football . . . since there are relatively
few athletes who are capable of playing professional football without the
benefit of . . . college competition.”218
Furthermore, the NFL has taken less restrictive alternative steps that
have directly addressed job security concerns of veteran players in the
league.219 In the latest collective bargaining agreement, the players’ union
and the league agreed to modify rookie contracts by predetermining the
contract amount for each draft pick.220 “[T]he NFLPA negotiating team, led
by veterans who were frustrated with rookies entering the league and making
more than proven players, was only too happy to shift funds to established
guys.”221 Through this amendment, veteran players gained more leverage in
contract negotiations for their proven skills, rather than have unproven
rookies set an inflated market price for their position.222

213.
Id. at 140.
214.
Id.
215.
See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434, 438 n.284; Cork
Gaines, Here’s How Much Money Players Lose When They Fall in the NFL Draft, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-draft-contract-values2016-4. Rookies generally sign a four-year contract. Gaines, supra.
216.
See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434.
217.
Id. at 407.
218.
Id. at 433; see also Legwold, supra note 19.
219.
See Andrew Brandt, The New Age of Rookie Contract Negotiations,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: MMQB (May 22, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/05/22/nfl-rookiecontract-negotiations.
220.
Id.
221.
Id.
222.
See John Czarnecki, Rookie Cap Biggest Win from New CBA, FOX SPORTS
(July 27, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/NFL-rookie-salary-capbiggest-win-from-new-CBA-less-risk-for-owners-072711. “The new collective bargaining
agreement somewhat changes what had become a ridiculous system in which a rookie, an
unproven professional, often was suddenly making more money than most of his veteran
teammates, even Pro Bowl selections.” Id.
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Conversely, the NFL has taken measures that have proven to be
detrimental to players’ job security.223 NFL Europe lasted for sixteen years,
operating as the NFL’s development league, prior to the NFL terminating the
league in 2007.224 On a roster, where more than twenty players are
considered reserves, it is a constant battle to stay employed.225 The defunct
development league helped to develop talents in ways unobtainable with the
current teams.226 Due to player safety concerns, offseason training activities
have been reduced,227 causing coaches to focus more on contributing players
rather than developing depth on their roster.228 NFL Europe, though
costly,229 allowed players on the fringe of making an NFL roster to gain
valuable practice opportunities and experience, which certainly enhanced
their prospects of securing and maintaining a job in the NFL.230 From a
business perspective, the league simply closed NFL Europe to maximize
profits,231 thanks, in part, to the free farm system that is college football.232 It
can certainly be argued that the draft eligibility rule does not primarily
223.
See Sean Keeler, ‘You Didn’t Play to Get Rich’: What Killed NFL
Europe?,
GUARDIAN
(June
23,
2016,
6:00
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jun/23/you-didnt-play-to-get-rich-what-killed-nfleurope.
224.
Football: After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/sports/29iht-nfl.4.6417232.html.
225.
See Marc Lillibridge, The Anatomy of a 53-Man Roster in the NFL,
BLEACHER REP. (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1640782-the-anatomy-ofa-53-man-roster-in-the-nfl; Released? Waived? Practice Squad? An NFL Roster Moves
Primer, FOX SPORTS (Sept. 2, 2016, 5:38 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/releasedwaived-practice-squad-an-nfl-roster-moves-primer-090216; Keeler, supra note 223.
226.
See Keeler, supra note 223.
227.
Judy Battista, Players Like Camp Restrictions; They’re Growing on
Coaches, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, at B8.
228.
See id.
229.
Football: After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 224.
“The league was reportedly losing about [thirty] million a season.” Id. But see Total Revenue
of all National Football League Teams from 2001 to 2015 (in Billion U. S. Dollars),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/193457/total-league-revenue-of-the-nfl-sinceSTATISTA,
2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). In 2007, when NFL Europe closed, league posted revenue of
7.09 billion. Id. Meaning that an expense of 30 million still equated to less than 1% of their
revenue. See id.
230.
See Keeler, supra note 223. “The value [of NFL Europe] was just in
terms of [the fact] guys that are on the lower end of the roster, you [a]re not getting much
better in OTAs. You [a]re not getting much better, honestly, in camps.” Id. (alteration in
original).
231.
See Football: After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note
224. “Goodell said it was time to develop a new international strategy, describing the move to
fold NFL Europa as the best business decision.” Id.; Keeler, supra note 223.
232.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 n.181
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Keeler, supra note 223; see also Football: After 16 Years, NFL Closes
European League, supra note 224.
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address a mandatory bargaining subject, instead acting as a market barrier for
a certain population of players which forces them to bargain their services
for a scholarship.233
2.

Rule of Reason Application to Draft Eligibility Rules

Despite the unsuccessful challenge to the eligibility rules in Clarett I,
courts have found that similar entry barriers violated the antitrust laws.234
Since the NFL has been recognized as a monopoly controlling the market for
football players’ services,235 it is pertinent to ensure that their practices are
not unreasonable restraints on the market for these players’ services.236
a.

Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market

The Supreme Court of the United States has allowed an intermediate
inquiry, known as quick-look, if the conduct is a naked restriction.237 They
explained that a quick-look analysis, under the rule of reason, is appropriate
where “the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be
ascertained,” and “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect.”238
As previously addressed, the market is clearly for football players’
services.239 The market for professional football players and college football
players is illusory, as the players providing this labor market involuntarily
submit to the mandatory pre-requisite that they provide services as a college
football player prior to becoming a professional.240 Certainly, few players
can make the jump from the high school rank to the pros,241 but they should
be afforded the right to pursue their profession free of unreasonable
obstructions.242 The only alternative to college football that would provide
monetary compensation is the minuscule Arena Football League (“AFL”).243
233.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02.
234.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004);
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02. But see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325
F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
235.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407; Janofsky, supra note 135.
236.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02.
237.
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999).
238.
Id. at 770.
239.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02.
240.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401, 409 n.185.
241.
Legwold, supra note 19.
242.
See id.
243.
See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATED BY AND
BETWEEN ARENA FOOTBALL ONE, LLC AND ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS UNION 13
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Based on the pay,244 it seems unfeasible to choose this path given the risk of
injury and the fact that the game itself is different than the NFL style of
play.245
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,246 the court
considered an NBA bylaw that restricted eligibility to players who were at
least four years removed from the date of their high school graduation an
unreasonable restraint of trade.247 Since then, the NBA has amended their
draft eligibility rules to once again prevent immediate eligibility to high
school graduates, albeit a reasonable restraint of only one year. 248 Similar
age-based restrictions have been struck down in professional hockey.249
Therefore, it is evident that the restriction constitutes a naked restriction that
has the anticompetitive effect of excluding players’ ability to render their
services to the NFL.250
b.

Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition

The Clarett I case provides the NFL’s procompetitive justifications
for the rule:
The purposes of the eligibility rule include [1] protecting younger
and/or less experienced players—that is, players who are less
mature physically and psychologically—from heightened risks of
injury in NFL games; [2] protecting the NFL’s entertainment
product from the adverse consequences associated with such
injuries; [3] protecting the NFL clubs from the costs and potential
(Aug. 10, 2012), www.aflpu.org/resources/ALFPU+AFL+CBA+2012.pdf; Sharks to Host
(Dec.
9,
2015),
Open
Tryout
in
Georgia,
ARENAFOOTBALL.COM
http://www.arenafootball.com/sports/a-footbl/spec-rel/120915aad.html.
244.
See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 239, at 13. AFL
salary range for veteran/rookie, $17,220–$18,375, over a twenty-one-game schedule, based on
fixed salary. Id.
245.
See Matt Bonesteel, Movement to Eliminate Kickoffs in College Football
POST
(July
18,
2016),
Reportedly
Gaining
Steam,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/07/18/movement-to-eliminatekickoffs-in-college-football-reportedly-gaining-steam/.
246.
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
247.
Id. at 1054.
248.
NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5.
249.
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317, 1320–21 (D.
Conn. 1977) (preliminarily enjoining a rule declaring players younger than twenty ineligible
for the hockey league draft because it was an illegal “group boycott, or a concerted refusal to
deal, [which] has been long and consistently classified as a per se violation of the Sherman
Act”).
250.
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398, 408 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321.
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liability entailed by such injuries; and [4] protecting from injury
and self-abuse other adolescents who would over-train—and use
steroids—in the misguided hope of developing prematurely the
251
strength and speed required to play in the NFL.

While the NFL wants to ensure the health of the younger players, the
first and fourth justifications are misguided attempts to feign caring for
players’ health, because it simply does not want to have the players injured at
its expense.252 These players face the same threat of injury at the collegiate
level.253 Under this notion, the NCAA should not allow true freshmen to
play against upperclassmen who have completed at least a year of a semiprofessional training regimen.254 This does not occur because of the
numerous opportunities high school prospects have to perfect their craft.255
The temptation of steroid use and overtraining exists, regardless of this rule,
as prep players are exposed to the pressures of reaching the exclusive
collegiate level to continue their aspirations of becoming a professional.256
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that
justifications offered under the rule of reason may be considered only to the
extent that they tend to show that “the challenged restraint enhances
competition.”257 Consequently, the first and fourth justifications hoping to
protect younger players’ wellbeing do not promote competition.258 The
second explanation prescribes that by “limiting the occurrence of player
injuries, [the rule] maintains the high quality of its entertainment product
and, thus, presumably enables the League to better compete with other
providers of sports entertainment such as other professional sports leagues or
amateur football.”259 Here, the league incorrectly assumes the validity of the
rule simply because it provides competition in a market—sports
entertainment—other than the market—football players’ service—in which
251.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
252.
See id. at 408, 408 n.181.
253.
See Bonesteel, supra note 245.
254.
See id. “NCAA moved kickoffs to the [thirty-five] yard line,” similar to
the NFL’s kickoff amendment in lieu of player safety concerns. Id.
255.
See Edwin Weathersby, Top 10 Camps Where College Football Recruits
Get
Noticed,
BLEACHER
REP.
(Mar.
26,
2014),
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/2005928-top-10-camps-where-college-footballrecruits-get-noticed/page/9.
256.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 § 31.2.3.4.
Percentage of high school football players to play in NCAA is 6.7%. NCAA RESEARCH,
supra note 1.
257.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984); Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.182.
258.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
259.
Id. at 409.
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the rule has an anticompetitive effect.260 Lastly, the NFL asserts that the rule
shields its teams from these injury-related costs.261 Cost reduction, alone, is
not considered a legitimate procompetitive justification;262 rather, it is a
component of a bargain that is “favorably affected by [competition].”263
Based on the reasons provided, it seems that the NFL has not offered any
strong justifications that the rule promotes competition in the market for
football players’ services.264
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NCAA and NFL are the two biggest providers of American
football entertainment.265 There is an undeniable nexus between these
organizations, in that one serves as the de facto development league for the
other.266 Both have implemented practices that unreasonably restrain this
shared labor market to their economic benefit.267
The NFL identified that they are direct competitors in the sports
entertainment market with amateur football.268

260.

See id. at 408–09, 409 n.185.

[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the
freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion
that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because
certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy.

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
261.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
262.
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir.
1998). “[C]ost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification.” Id.
263.
Id.; see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411,
423 (1990).
[T]he ‘Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will
produce not only lower prices but, also, better goods and services.’ This judgment
‘recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—
and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to
select among alternative offers.’

FTC, 493 U.S. at 423 (citation omitted).
264.
See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408–10. Let it be noted that the only case
to analyze the procompetitive justifications of the modern draft eligibility rule held that “the
League . . . failed to offer any legitimate procompetitive justifications for the Rule.” Id. at
409.
265.
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004);
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409, n.185.
266.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 24.
267.
See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
268.
Id.
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The conspiracy or agreement to fix prices or to rig bids is the key
element of a Sherman Act criminal case. In effect, the conspiracy
must comprise [of] an agreement, understanding or meeting of the
minds between at least two competitors or potential competitors,
for the purpose or with the effect of unreasonably restraining
269
trade.

More damning is the fact that the NFL attempted to justify their draft
eligibility rule by “excluding the most talented college players from the NFL,
[to sustain] ‘the NCAA’s ability to compete in the entertainment market.’”270
With the dissolution of NFL Europe, it is apparent that the NFL has a keen
interest in the viability of its free farm system.271 Unfortunately, this is in
direct conflict with the precedent established in United States v. Topco
Associates, Incorporated,272 that competition in one market—football players
services—may not be suppressed in favor for another market—entertainment
market.273 Additionally, the NCAA has further impacted the restraints on
football players’ services by promoting amateurism rules that render any
hopeful professional player an indentured servant for a minimum of three
years.274
Since the NCAA has now allowed for student-athletes to receive
scholarships capped at the full cost of attendance,275 it seems that any further
compensation may contradict the idea of amateurism.276 With perpetual
269.
Antitrust Resource Manual: Elements of the Offense, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-7-elements-offense (last updated Oct.
2011).
270.
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409 n.185.
271.
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972);
Football: After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 220; Mike Florio,
Fournette Definitely Should Take a Year off in 2016, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:33 AM),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/09/30/fournette-definitely-should-take-a-year-offin-2016/.
272.
405 U.S. 596 (1972).
273.
Id. at 610.
274.
See Daniel Roberts, Does the NCAA Make Its Money from Indentured
Servants?, YAHOO: FIN. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-the-ncaa-makeits-money-from-indentured-servants-184409356.html.
[T]he athletes are promised an education, but in fact [do not] get the same one their
fellow students get because they devote the vast majority of their time to their sport.
Second, the NCAA’s strict rules around amateurism bring down harsh punishments
on athletes for even the tiniest of infractions . . . . The third problem is the big
money the NCAA sees, while its athletes see none of it. “The NCAA is running a
cartel,” Nocera rails, “where everybody gets rich except the labor force.” He likens
NCAA athletes to indentured servants.

Id.
275.
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
276.
See id. at 1058; Novy, supra note 163, at 229.
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yearly revenue increases,277 this appears to be a temporary solution to an
aspect of a larger problem.278 Schools will continue to benefit financially
from the services provided by football players at a fixed cost of attendance,
which ensurs unfathomable profit margins.279 The state of college sports will
continue to have improper benefits scandals, ironically, due to the collusion
by the NFL and NCAA to promote the importance of college.280 As students
are forced to attend class each day and go through the rigors of being a
college athlete, they realize the limited earning potential of their fragile
careers.281 With the popularity of the sport being at an all-time high, studentathletes see the earnings that their respective programs gross as a result of
their hard work.282 Yet they face unreasonable restrictions that, if violated,
could effectively end their ability to earn a living from their skill before it
ever materialized.283 This greedy practice has led sports pundits to call for
star college players to sit-out seasons to remain healthy and keep their
professional aspirations intact.284 However, it would take a selfless
individual to do so, because this is a daunting task to place on a nineteen or
twenty year old who does not want to offend the establishment.285 This
displays the overwhelming amount of power these two entities possess.286
Some students choose to attend college to obtain marketable skills
that will benefit them in their career.287 Although the likelihood of reaching
the professional level is low,288 some football players only want to acquire

277.
See Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. Texas A&M’s 2014 revenue
increased by $73,133,004 in comparison to the previous year. Id.
278.
See Novy, supra note 163, at 230.
279.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054–55; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30.
280.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. “[T]he NFL has required aspiring
professional football players to wait a sufficient period of time after graduating high school to
accommodate and encourage college attendance before entering the NFL draft.” Clarett v.
Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). This statement makes the rule seem
far less stringent than it actually is. See id. It appears as though football players are truly
given a choice to either play at the collegiate level in exchange for only a college education or
become a professional. See id. Since there is no realistic alternative to college, they are
forced to accept the only option on the table. Id.
281.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; Novy, supra note 163, at 229–30.
282.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30.
283.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Florio, supra note 271.
284.
Florio, supra note 271. The position Fournette plays, running back, has
the second shortest average career span, at only two and a half years. Rob Arthur, The
Shrinking Shelf Life of NFL Players, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-shrinkingshelf-life-of-nfl-players-1456694959 (last updated Feb. 29, 2016, 12:42 AM).
285.
See Florio, supra note 271.
286.
See id.
287.
Id.
288.
See NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1.
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marketable skills that will benefit them in their professional careers.289 In
Denver Rockets, the court stated, “[p]rofessional basketball is the only trade
in which Haywood can employ his unusual talents and skills. Unless
Haywood plays professional basketball, those skills and talents will
depreciate.”290 Taking the same approach in regards to football players,
professional football is the only trade in which players can employ their
talents and skills.291 Though some players have no desire to obtain a college
education, the NFL sees fit to force it upon them—possibly depreciating a
players’ talent and worth at that players’ expense.292 Unlike other careers,
where certain skills transcend across a variety of jobs giving an individual
several options to establish a career path, the unique skill of a football player
is forced down the same beaten path.293 Even in other professional sports,
players are afforded various options into the labor market.294 This liberty
would certainly help improve the amateur image that the NCAA tries so
vehemently to uphold because athletes would be given a true choice to attend
school for the benefit of an education rather than begin their professional
careers.295
It is unfortunate that arguably the most violent sport is controlled by
two entities that continually exploit the skills of football players.296 It is
almost a guarantee that a football player will suffer some type of injury prior
to embarking on their professional career.297 The limits placed on these
individuals ensures that both the NCAA and NFL can milk a player for six or
seven years of labor while only paying compensation, at an equitable rate,298
for half that time.299 The NFL gets a player that is possibly already in their
289.
See Florio, supra note 271.
290.
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
291.
See Glauber, supra note 95.
292.
Thamel, supra note 6, at 42.
293.
See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Glauber, supra note 95.
294.
MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7. A baseball prospect can turn professional
immediately after graduating from high school or after their junior college season. Id. If
prospects elect to go to junior or community college, they can declare for the draft regardless
of time spent in school. Id. Basketball prospects can play a season overseas to avoid college
and immediately turn professional once graduating high school. See Thamel, supra note 6.
295.
Thamel, supra note 6; see also Roberts, supra note 274.
296.
See Viera, supra note 20, at D1.
297.
See id.
298.
See Soffian, supra note 33; Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. Until 2015, a
majority of school scholarships were year-to-year and renewable at the school’s discretion.
Soffian, supra note 33. Ironically, the athlete’s performance on the field could determine
whether he remained a student. Id.
299.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 24.
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prime without spending a dime to develop them, while the NCAA just
milked that cash cow and maybe did not even have to pay for a fourth year of
schooling.300 The average NFL career span shows the sacredness of every
snap in a player’s career meaning that a lot of players may not be able to
maximize their earnings because the NFL would of course devalue them as
damaged goods.301 Yes, there are superstar football players being paid
boatloads of cash, but there are only a few of these players on every team
roster.302 For a majority, lasting past their rookie contract is a blessing and
they are willing to take what a NFL team deems is their value.303 Older
players commanding a higher veteran minimum salary are essentially ushered
out of the league because they are considered to have too much wear and
tear on their bodies.304 It is a tragedy to limit these players’ talents as their
value diminishes with each hit.305
Pending the conclusion of O’Bannon, the NCAA’s amateurism rules
may receive another chink in its armor.306 However, hopes are that this
Comment has displayed the collusive practices that the NCAA and NFL have
engaged in to effectively control the labor market for all football players’
services.307 The NFL and NCAA have a symbiotic relationship in that the
League’s eligibility rule provides a steady flow of talent to colleges—whom
fatten their wallets from this talent—while colleges provide the best
developed talent at no cost to the league.308 Forget the Fail Mary or the
Immaculate Reception, this arrangement between the NCAA and NFL is the
biggest logic-defying play in the sport’s history.309 There’s just one problem:
There is a flag.310
300.
See id.
301.
See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12.
302.
See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12.
303.
See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12.
304.
Brandt, supra note 215.
305.
See Breslow, supra note 16.
306.
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062–63
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016).
307.
Id.; Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408–09
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Janofsky, supra note 135.
308.
See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409; Underwood, supra note 1, at 22.
309.
John McTigue, MNF Moments, No. 1: The Fail Mary, ESPN.COM (Sept.
8, 2014), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/138835/mnf-moments-no-1-thefail-mary; see also Gary Meyers, Top 10 Greatest Plays in NFL History: From the
Immaculate Reception to John Elway’s Helicopter Ride, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9 2015,
8:51 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/top-10-greatest-plays-nfl-historyarticle-1.2354371. During a brief NFL referee lockout, a replacement referee notoriously
incorrectly declared an interception a touchdown to give the Seattle Seahawks an improbable
win over the Green Bay Packers. McTigue, supra.
Just [twenty-two] seconds remained and [the Steelers] trailed the Raiders 7–6 in the
divisional round of the playoffs. Steelers owner Art Rooney was already on his
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